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“Better off, as judged by themselves”: Do people support nudges as a method to change 
their own behavior? 
 
Abstract 
In this study we investigated how people evaluate Behavioral Interventions (BIs) that are targeted 
at themselves, aiming to promote their own health and wellbeing. We compared the impact on 
people’s assessments of the acceptability of using BIs to change their own behavior of: the 
transparency of the BI (transparent or opaque), the designer of the BI (researchers, government 
policy makers, advertisers) and three types of arguments regarding their efficacy (positive, positive 
+ negative, negative). Our target BIs were actual interventions that have been used in a range of 
policy domains (diet, exercise, alcohol consumption, smoking, personal finances). We found that 
transparent BIs were considered more acceptable than opaque BIs. On average, all BIs were 
considered acceptable for changing participants’ own behavior, except for the opaque BI in the 
finance context; there was differential acceptability of BIs across contexts, with finance clearly 
least acceptable. However, the perceived effectiveness of the BIs was at least as influential a 
predictor of acceptability ratings as the ease of identification of the behavior change mechanism 
across the five contexts. Further, effectiveness was partially mediated by desire to change, 
suggesting that people do think BIs make them better off, “as judged by themselves”. 
 
Keywords: Behavioral Interventions, Effectiveness, Libertarian Paternalism, Nudge, 
Transparency 
 




Behavioral Interventions (BIs)—sometimes called nudges—use behavioral science to generate a 
change in behavior without fundamentally changing the incentive structure of the context in which 
decisions are made (see Osman et al, 2018; also Oliver, 2013). BIs can be used for many ends, e.g. 
to conserve the environment, to get people to pay their taxes on time, or to promote health and 
wellbeing. Examples of BIs in health and wellbeing include changing the default on pensions, so 
that a portion of an employee’s salary is put into retirement saving unless they opt out, and 
changing the size of glassware in pubs to encourage people to drink less.1 All over the world BIs 
are being used in public policy, in domains including health, finance, consumer protection, 
education, energy, the environment, transport, taxation, telecommunications, public service 
delivery, and the labor market (OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2015).  
 
In some situations where BIs are used, people have a clear interest in the behavior of others. For 
instance, when we face a problem of social cooperation such as conserving the environment or a 
“negative externality” (a cost incurred by a third party) such as second-hand smoke, then BIs can 
encourage people to behave prosocially. But in some cases, BIs are supposed to promote the self-
interest of the recipients, for instance when implemented in the context of health behaviors. One 
prominent argument for using BIs that promote health and wellbeing is that they “make choosers 
better off, as judged by themselves” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.5). This is an empirical claim, 
which needs to be judged in the light of the evidence. 
 
 
1 BIs are part of a broader behavioural insights approach, which integrates insights and 
methodologies from the behavioural and social sciences (including decision making, psychology, 
cognitive science, neuroscience, organisational and group behaviour), in order to deliver evidence-
based public policy (OECD, 2016). 
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Recent work suggests that the majority of the public find BIs acceptable (Hagman et al., 2015; 
Jung & Mellers, 2016; Osman et al., 2018; Petrescu, et al, 2016; Reisch, & Sunstein, 2016; Reisch, 
Sunstein & Gwozdz, 2016; Venema, Kroese, & De Ridder, 2018). However, people may approve 
of BIs because they hope that they will change other people’s behavior. Studies show that people’s 
support for BIs is higher when they are given a justification of the policy in terms of its effects on 
“people” in general than when they are given a justification in terms of the effects on “you” 
(Cornwell & Krantz, 2014). People also think that BIs will be more effective for others than for 
themselves and their judgments of the acceptability of BIs are predicted by how effective they 
anticipate BIs will be on others’ behavior, whereas evidence is mixed as to whether acceptability 
judgments are predicted by how effective BIs will be at changing their own behavior (Bang, Shu 
and Weber, 2018). In these cases, people may regard the ill health of others as imposing an 
externality on them, through the economic costs of ill health, which may increase insurance 
premiums or which may require increased government spending, especially in countries with 
socialized medicine (Gold, 2018). Alternatively, it may be that people have “meddlesome 
preferences”, preferences about how other people behave in domains where everyone should be 
free to make their own decisions (Sen, 1970; Blau, 1975).  Indeed, a systematic review of the 
acceptability of government intervention to change health-related behaviors found that support for 
the interventions was highest among those not engaging in the targeted behavior (Diepeveen, 
2013).   
 
In order to judge whether BIs make choosers better off, as judged by themselves, we need evidence 
which directly targets that claim. There is debate about how exactly to cash out the claim (Sugden, 
2017; Sugden, 2018; Sunstein, 2018), but a first start is to investigate whether people support BIs 
as a method to change their own behavior. Previous studies, which have asked in general terms 
whether BIs are acceptable, cannot distinguish whether people support them because they want to 
change their own behavior, or because they want other peoples’ behavior to be changed. The 
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studies cited above (Diepeveen, 2013; Bang, Shu, & Weber, 2018) suggest that support is at least 
partly driven by a desire to change other people’s behavior. Therefore, in this study we investigate 
how people evaluate BIs that are targeted at promoting their own health and wellbeing, asking 
them how acceptable it is for BIs to be used to change their own behavior. 
 
Previous studies 
We build on previous empirical work about factors that affect the acceptability of BIs.  
Transparency matters. Previous work has consistently shown that people evaluate BIs more 
favorably when they are aware of the process that leads to behavioral change (Diepeveen et al., 
2013; Felsen, et al., 2013; Jung & Mellers, 2016; Osman et al., 2018; Petrescu, et al, 2016; Reisch, 
& Sunstein, 2016; Reisch, Sunstein & Gwozdz., 2016; Sunstein, 2016). They prefer transparent 
BIs, where they can identify the mechanism that is being used to influence their behavior, as 
opposed to opaque BIs, where they cannot identify the mechanism of behavioral change. We define 
transparency in terms of ease of identification of the mechanism underpinning the BI, which has 
been used by other researchers (e.g. Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Bang, Shu, & Weber, 2018).2 
Another way of achieving transparency is via disclosure, telling people at the point of decision that 
BIs are being used to change their behavior. The two sorts of transparency are related because, as 
well as revealing the intended effect of the BI, full disclosure can include revealing the mechanism 
of behavior change. One explanation of the preference for transparency is that it enables people to 
maintain a sense of agency over the behavior being targeted by the BI (Osman, 2014). Free choice 
is underpinned by a sense of agency and so, relative to opaque interventions, if people know how 
 
2 Others have couched this distinction in terms of System-1 vs System-2 BIs (e.g. Jung & Mellors, 
2016; Sunstein 2016), but we prefer the terminology of Transparent and Opaque because it does 
involve a commitment to there being two separate systems in the brain, but it cuts up the BI space in 
the same way (Lin, Osman, & Ashcroft, 2017). 
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behavior change is achieved, then they feel they can more easily choose to do otherwise, thus 
preserving their autonomy (Lin, Osman, & Ashcroft, 2017; Osman, Lin, & Ashcroft, 2017).  
 
Designer matters. Previous research shows that people trust BIs that are developed and proposed 
by researchers more than those that are developed and proposed by government (Osman et al, 
2018). We also know that trust in government affects the acceptability of government interventions 
(Branson et al 2012) and it has been suggested that negative attitudes to BIs stem from mistrust in 
government (Jung and Mellors, 2016). In support of this conjecture, Bang, Shu and Weber (2018) 
found that the acceptability of BIs depends on who designs and implements them (a friend being 
more acceptable than a government or corporate designer) and that these differences in 
acceptability were explained by perceived differences in the intention of the designer. Consistent 
with this story, Tannenbaum, Fox, & Rogers (2017) found that people’s support for a BI depended 
on whether they were told that it had been enforced by a policy-maker they supported or one they 
opposed (Bush vs Obama administration).   
 
Expectations about effectiveness matter. Previous research shows that the acceptability of 
government interventions and BIs strongly depends on their expected effectiveness (Pechey et al., 
2014; Petrescu et al., 2016) and that directly manipulating the effectiveness of BIs by quantifying 
the resulting change in behavior affects acceptability (Arad & Rubinstein, 2018; Sunstein, 2016). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that giving people positive arguments, telling them that BIs are likely 
to be effective, affects their evaluations of the BIs. Sunstein (2016) found that, although people 
prefer transparent BIs to opaque ones, telling people that opaque BIs were more effective shifted 
their preferences towards opaque BIs by approximately 12% from baseline.  However, to date, 
there is no work investigating the impact of negative arguments, telling people about possible 
backfire effects of the intervention, even though, outside of the laboratory, discussions about the 
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effectiveness of BIs are more likely to be put in terms of general arguments for and against than 
to have precise quantifications attached. 
 
Present Study 
In the present study we compared the impact on people’s assessments of the acceptability of using 
BIs to change their own behavior of: the transparency of the BI (Transparent or Opaque), the 
designer of the BI (Researchers, Government, Advertisers), and three types of arguments regarding 
their efficacy (Positive, Positive + Negative, Negative). We tested the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Transparent BIs will be more acceptable than opaque BIs 
Hypothesis 2:  The designer of the BI will affect the acceptability of the BI 
Hypothesis 3: The type of argument given will affect the acceptability of the BI 
Hypothesis 4: There will be an interaction effect between the designer of the BI and the type of 
argument given 
The rationale for Hypothesis 4 is that the more ambiguous the outcome of the BI, or the more 
salient the possible backfire effects, the more important the trustworthiness of the designer will be. 
Information about possible negative effects could cause people to doubt either the expertise or the 
intentions of the designer. 
 
We expect that the transparency of a BI and its perceived likelihood of being effective are both 
factors that explain the acceptability of a BI, and that these are mediated by a desire to change 
one’s behavior through transparent and effective methods. Therefore, in order to discover the 
relative weight given to transparency and effectiveness, and to test for mediation by desire to 
change behavior, we asked participants to rate the perceived transparency and effectiveness of 
each BI, and their desire to have their behavior changed by that method. We also used the 
transparency and effectiveness ratings as manipulation checks. 
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In order to establish the generalizability of any results, we used five different contexts in which 
behavioral interventions have been implemented to promote health and wellbeing—exercise, diet, 
smoking, alcohol, and finance—and compared acceptability across contexts. All the interventions 






We used a mixed factorial design, with one within-subject factor and three between-subject factors, 
to give a 5 x 2 x 3 x 3 design. The within-subject manipulation was 5 different contexts in which 
a behavioral intervention was implemented (Exercise, Diet, Smoking, Alcohol, Finance). The 
between-subject manipulations were: 2 Transparency of the BI (Transparent, Opaque) x 3 
Designer of the BI (Researcher, Government, Advertiser) x 3 Argument about the likely 
effectiveness of the BI (Positive [Experiment 1a], Positive + Negative [Experiment 1b], Negative 
[Experiment 1c]). Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c were run in serial (no-one participated in more than 
one experiment); in each experiment participants were randomly allocated to one of the 6 between-
subject conditions.  
 
For each context, there were four probative questions regarding BIs. After responding to the probes 
in all five contexts, participants were asked five demographic questions, about their age, sex, 
education, political affiliation, and religion, and whether they were a smoker. At the end of the 
experiment, they were also asked some questions about their attitudes to BIs, including to indicate 
which contexts should not involve psychological methods designed to change behavior. 
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All experiments were presented via Qualtrics, which is an online platform for running experiments, 
and launched via Prolific Academic, a crowd sourcing system for participant recruitment of those 
who have university email addresses, including large pools in the US and UK, both of which we 
used. All participants were financially compensated for their time (90 cents), calculated according 
to Prolific Academic’s rates.  
 
QMUL college ethics board granted ethical approval for the experiments under the project titled 
“Ethical concerns around nudges”, QMERC2014/54.  
 
Participants 
Each experiment included US (total N = 872) and UK samples (total N = 843) (see Table 1). 
Although Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c were run serially, they drew from the same population and 
there were no differences in demographics (see Appendix 1 for details) so we have combined them 
for the analysis.3 Participants who took much less or more time to complete the task than the 
allocated time (less than 8 or more than 30 minutes) were excluded. Four further participants failed 
an attention check question and were removed from the analysis. 
 




3 Specifically: there were no statistically significant differences between experiments for age, sex, 
religion, and education. There were differences in political affiliation between experiments, but 
those differences were not significant predictors of acceptability ratings, including as interaction 
terms in a Multivariate ANOVA. Full details are in Appendix 1. 
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After consenting to take part in the experiment, all participants were told that they were going to 
be asked questions about psychological methods that have been used to bring about behavior 
change and that “All of these methods are designed to help guide people to make the best decision 
for their own health and wellbeing.” For full instructions see Appendix 2.  
 
Manipulation of designer 
Participants were told that, “The [Top Advertising Company, Government, Top Researchers in 
laboratories] in this country is/ are using psychological research to help develop a set of simple 
methods that adjust the way information is presented, so that it can help people to make better 
decisions. The reason for using psychological methods is to help improve people’s behavior, because 
in many day-to-day contexts people may not make a decision that is best for their own health, 
wellbeing, and their happiness.”  
 
Behavioral Interventions and manipulation of transparency 
Then participants were presented with a description of a behavioral intervention. For each context, 
there were two behavioral interventions, one which was transparent and one which was opaque, 
all based on genuine interventions that have been implemented. Participants were randomly 
assigned to receive descriptions of either five transparent BIs or five opaque BIs. (The ten BIs are 
given in Table 2.) For each context, first, they were told what the context was in which the method 
would be used (e.g., “Smoking”), and what the Recommended Psychological Method was, e.g., 
“Design cigarette packaging so that it incorporates graphic pictures of damaged lungs and 
warnings such as ‘Smoking seriously harms you and others around you’, ‘Smoking harms your 
unborn baby’.” The order of presentation of the five contexts was randomized for each participant. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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Arguments and manipulation of effectiveness 
In Experiment 1a and 1b participants were then presented with,  
“Argument for method to work: By highlighting the negative physical and moral issues 
concerning smoking, the negative experiences will become more obviously associated with 
smoking, and this will encourage smokers to reduce or even stop smoking.”  
 
In Experiment 1b and 1c participants were presented with, 
“Argument for method NOT to work: By highlighting the negative physical and moral issues 
concerning smoking, the negative experiences will become so obviously associated with smoking, 
that smokers will feel more defensive of their smoking habit, as a result, smokers will end up 
smoking more, meaning that the method will lead to increases in smoking.”  
 
A full list of the arguments for each Context can be found in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Explanation of transparency  
Before the first probe, all participants were provided with the following definition of transparent 
and opaque BIs, 
“There are two types of psychological methods: Transparent and non-transparent. A transparent 
psychological method works in such a way that anyone can easily identify the actual psychological 
method used to change their behavior, as well as easily identify how their behavior is changed by 
it.  A non-transparent psychological method works in such a way that no one can identify the actual 
psychological method used to change their behavior, and no one can identify how their behavior 




For each of the five BIs all participants were required to respond to four questions concerning:  
1) Ease of identification 
To what extent is it easy for you to identify HOW your behavior is going to be changed by the 
psychological method? (Scale 0 = I cannot easily identify how my behavior is changed by the 
psychological method to 100 = I can easily identify how my behavior is changed by the 
psychological method) 
2) Desire to change behavior  
To what extent do you want to change your behavior through the psychological method in this 
particular situation?  (Scale 1 = Not at all likely to 9 = Very Likely) 
3) Effectiveness  
To what extent do you think the psychological method used in this particular situation would 
positively change YOUR behavior?  (Scale 1 = Not all likely to 9 = Very likely) 
4) Acceptability  
To what extent do you think it is acceptable to use the psychological method described in this 
context to change your behavior? (Scale 1 = Unacceptable to 9 = Acceptable) 
 
Once participants had responded to all four questions for each of the five scenarios, they were 
presented with 5 demographic questions about their age, sex, education level, political affiliation, 
and religion, and asked whether they smoked or not (or preferred not to say).  
 
In addition, we asked several exploratory questions, most of which we did not analyze since they 
do not bear directly on our hypotheses. Participants were asked: about the extent to which each BI 
would lead to positive changes in behavior in the population; whether they think there are ethical 
issues concerning each BI and, if so, what they are; and some questions about how they value their 
health and wellbeing. Full instructions are in Appendix 2. 
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We have analyzed one of our exploratory questions because it was relevant given our results. At 
the end of the experiment, participants were asked to indicate which contexts SHOULD NOT 
involve psychological methods designed to change behavior, with the following possible responses 
(they could choose as many or as few as they wanted, so a participant may have chosen multiple 
options): 
q Food & Nutrition decisions concerning food, drink and nutritional intake  
q Smoking decisions to quit smoking  
q Alcohol decisions to reduce drinking  
q Exercise decisions to increase levels of physical activity  
q Financial decisions concerning investment   
q Financial decisions concerning savings  
q NONE of five contexts should have psychological methods used to influence decision-making 
behavior  
q I cannot decide  
q All the contexts should have psychological methods implemented to influence decision-making 
behavior  
 
We analyzed a second of our exploratory questions at the request of an anonymous reviewer. For 
each of the five BIs, we asked: 
Based on the psychological method used in this particular situation, to what extent do you think it 
would lead to positive changes in behaviour IN THE POPULATION? (Scale 1 = Not all likely to 





Manipulation check: Ease of identification of behavior change method ratings 
In order to test that our manipulation of transparency worked, we ran a four-way mixed 
Multivariate ANOVA, with the Ease of identification ratings in the five contexts as the dependent 
variables, Context as the within-subject variable, and the elements of the factorial design supplying 
the between-subject independent variables (including interaction effects). 
 
Tests of between-subject effects showed that our manipulation affected Ease of identification 
across all contexts combined. As we expected, given that we manipulated transparency, there was 
a small-medium main effect of Ease of identification, F(1, 1697) = 163.70, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.88, with the Ease of identification of Transparent BIs (M = 69.21, SE = .57) being higher than 
Opaque ones (M = 58.85 SE = .57). There were no other statistically significant effects. The full 
between-subjects model is in Appendix 3.  
 
Multivariate tests showed that the difference in Ease of Identification between Opaque and 
Transparent BIs was also found in most of individual contexts. There was a small-medium 
interaction effect between Ease of identification and Transparency, F (4, 1694) = 38.31, p < .001, 
Wilks’ Λ = 0.114, partial η2 = .012. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the Transparent 
BIs all had higher Ease of identification ratings than the Opaque ones in all contexts except Diet 
(all p < 0.001, except Diet which was p = 0.144). See Figure 1. The full set of multivariate tests 
are in Appendix 3, as are the results of the less powerful within-subject tests, which show the same 
pattern of effects. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Manipulation check: Effectiveness ratings 
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In order to test whether giving different arguments affected the perceived effectiveness of the BIs, 
we ran a four-way mixed Multivariate ANOVA, with the Effectiveness ratings in the five contexts 
as the dependent variables, Context as the within-subject variable, and the elements of the factorial 
design supplying the between-subject independent variables (including interaction effects). 
 
The between-subjects tests showed that our manipulations failed to have the desired effect on 
Effectiveness, across all contexts combined. There was only a very small main effect of Argument 
F(1, 1697) = 61.66, p = .006, partial η2 = .006, and a very small effect of Designer, F(1, 1697) = 
3.66, p = .026, partial η2 = .004. Surprisingly, the largest main effect was the small main effect of 
Transparency, F(1, 1697) = 86.25, p < .001, partial η2 = .048 on effectiveness ratings. There were 
no significant interaction effects. See Appendix 3 for the full model.  
 
Multivariate tests showed that the effect of Transparency on Effectiveness was also seen in the 
individual contexts. There was a medium-sized interaction effect between Effectiveness and 
Transparency, F (4, 1694) = 38.98, p < .001, Wilks’ Λ = 0.916, partial η2 = .084. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the Transparent BIs were rated as more likely to be effective than 
Opaque ones in all contexts except Alcohol (all p < 0.001, except Diet which was p = 0.02 and 
Alcohol which was p = 0.267). See Figure 2. The full set of multivariate tests are in Appendix 3, 
as are the results of the less powerful within-subject tests, which showed the same pattern of 
effects. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Hypothesis testing: Acceptability ratings 
We ran a four-way mixed Multivariate ANOVA, with the participants’ Acceptability ratings in the 
five contexts as the dependent variables, Context as the within-subject variable, and the elements 
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of the factorial design supplying the between-subject independent variables (including interaction 
effects). We used between-subject tests to examine our hypotheses across the five contexts 




There was a medium-sized main effect of Transparency, F(1, 1697) = 248.08, p < .001, partial η2 
= .128, with the acceptability of Transparent BIs (M = 6.96, SE = .05) being higher than Opaque 
(M = 5.86, SE = .05). This supports Hypothesis 1, that transparent BIs will be more acceptable 
than opaque. 
 
There was a significant but negligible main effect of Designer F(1, 1697) = 3.60, p = .028, 
partial η2 = .004: Researchers M = 6.533, SE =.060; Advertisers M = 6.384, SE = .061; 
Government M = 6.309, SE =.060. This technically supports Hypothesis 2, that the designer of 
the BI will affect its acceptability, but the effect size is not meaningful. 
 
There was a small main effect of Argument, F(2, 1697) = 10.52, p < .001, partial η2 = .012. Post-
hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the effect of Argument was due to the mean acceptability 
being higher for Positive (M = 6.64, SE = 0.064) than for Positive + Negative (M = 6.33, SE = 
0.058) and Negative (M = 6.26, SE = 0.058; both p < 0.001 and well under the Bonferroni adjusted 
significance level of p = 0.017) but there was no significant difference between acceptability for 
Positive + Negative and Negative (p = 0.37). This supports Hypothesis 3, that the arguments will 
affect the acceptability of the BI. 
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There were no significant interaction effects, so Hypothesis 4, that there will be an interaction 
effect between the designer of the BI and the type of argument, was not supported. See Appendix 
3 for the full model.  
 
Multivariate tests 
Multivariate tests, exploring our within-subject variable, showed the differential acceptability of 
BIs in the five contexts. There was a large main effect of Context on Acceptability, F (4, 1694) = 
423.40, p < .001, Wilks’ Λ = 0.495, partial η2 = .505, suggesting that there were differences in 
Acceptability between at least one pair of contexts. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that 
the means of the Acceptability ratings in each context differed (all p < 0.001, lower than the 
Bonferroni adjusted significance level of p = 0.005) except for the means of Smoking and Alcohol 
(p = 0.71). The BIs were most acceptable in the context of Exercise (M = 7.28, SE = .048), followed 
by Diet (M = 6.97, SE = .046), Smoking (M = 6.55, SE = 0.051), Alcohol (M = 6.53, SE = 0.052), 
and Finance (M = 4.72, SE = 0.054). 
 
There was a large interaction effect between Acceptability and Transparency, F (4, 1694) = 
4122.94, p < .001, Wilks’ Λ = 0.777, partial η2 = .225. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed 
that the Transparent BIs were rated as more acceptable than the Opaque BIs in all contexts except 
Exercise (all p < 0.001 except Exercise, which at p = .027 was more than the Bonferroni adjusted 
significance level of p = .01). See Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
There was also a small interaction effect between Acceptability and Argument, F (8, 3388) = 4.44, 
p < .001, Wilks’ Λ = 0.979, partial η2 = .010, and a very small three-way interaction between 
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Acceptability, Argument, and Transparency, F (8, 3388) = 2.91, p < .003, Wilks’ Λ = 0.986, partial 
η2 = .007. See Figure 4. Post hoc tests and means can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
There were no significant effects of the Designer of the BI. See Figure 5. 
 
The results of within-subject effects tests confirmed the results of the multivariate tests. The full 
set of multivariate tests and within-subject tests can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
Predictors of Acceptability ratings 
We ran regressions to discover the best predictors of Acceptability judgments in each context, 
using standardized coefficients in order to be able to meaningfully compare effect sizes. For the 
Smoking context we also ran a set of regressions that were limited to the participants who said 
they were smokers, since smokers are a small proportion of the population, less than 20% in the 
UK (ONS, 2018). The models are given in Table 4. For each context, Model 1 had Ease of 
identification ratings as the sole predictor, Model 2 had Effectiveness as the sole predictor, Model 
3 had Desire to change behavior as the sole predictor, Model 4 had both Ease of identification and 
Effectiveness as predictors, and Model 5 had all three of Ease of identification, Effectiveness, and 
Desire to change behavior as predictors.  
There are clear patterns that held across the five contexts. All three ratings were significant 
predictors of Acceptability ratings when entered into the Model separately (Models 1-3, Table 4), 
except that Ease of identification was not a significant predictor amongst smokers for the 
acceptability of BIs for Smoking in any of the models.  
Comparing the predictive power of Ease of identification and Effectiveness by entering them both 
in Model 4, we can see that, across contexts, Effectiveness had a bigger effect on Acceptability 
than Ease of identification (except for Exercise, where they were approximately equal with ß = 
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.230 for Ease of identification and ß = .228 for Effectiveness, both p < 0.001). The largest 
differences were found in the Finance context, where the coefficient on Effectiveness was more 
than four times larger than that on Ease of identification (ß = .140 for Ease of identification, ß = 
.597 for Effectiveness, both p < 0.001), and amongst smokers in the Smoking context (ß = .003, p 
= 0.963 for Ease of identification, ß = .463 for Effectiveness, p < 0.001) 
 
Table 4 around here 
 
However, when we added Desire to change behavior into the models (Model 5), the coefficient on 
Effectiveness clearly decreased. In the case of Exercise, Effectiveness even became non-
significant, ß = .037, p = 0.295. This suggests that Desire to change wholly mediates Effectiveness 
for Exercise and partially mediates Effectiveness in the other four contexts. We confirmed this by 
testing the remaining step for mediation (Baron and Kenny, 1986): regressing Effectiveness on 
Desire to change. The Models in Table 5 show that Effectiveness was a significant predictor of 
Desire to change behavior in all five contexts, confirming that Desire to change partially mediated 
Effectiveness. 
 
Table 5 around here 
 
Multiple-choice question on use of BIs in different contexts 
BIs were clearly less acceptable in financial contexts, with 63% of participants saying that they 
should not be used for financial decisions involving investment and 53.4% saying that they should 
not be used for financial decisions involving savings. The next largest group was the 13.8% who 
could not decide and all the other answers were chosen by less than 10%. See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 around here 
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Perceived effectiveness of BIs on self compared to effectiveness of BIs on the population 
The BI was judged likely to be more effective on the population’s behaviour than on the 
participant’s own behaviour for four out of our five BIs, as shown by paired t-tests: Diet, 
population behaviour M = 5.64, SD = 1.8,2 own behaviour M = 5.47, SD = 2.23, t(1714) = 3.9, p 
< 0.001; Smoking, population behaviour M = 5.24, SD = 1.93, own behaviour M = 4.79, SD = 
2.44, t(1714) = 8.7, p < 0.001; Alcohol, population behaviour M = 4.27, SD = 1.95, own behaviour 
M = 4.01, SD = 2.26, t(1714) = 5.8, p < 0.001; Finance, population behaviour M = 4.20, SD = 2.07, 
own behaviour M = 4.79, SD = 2.32, t(1714) = 10.4, p < 0.001. For Exercise the difference was in 
the other direction, with participants judging the BI as less likely to affect population behaviour 
(M = 4.78, SD = 2.00) than their own (M = 5.02, SD = 2.38), t(1714) = -6.2, p < 0.001. We 
investigated this difference further, by running Multivariate ANOVAs for each domain with the 
effectiveness on own behaviour and population behaviour as the dependent variables (so own-
population behaviour as a within-subject variable) and Transparency as the between-subject 
dependent variable. For all five areas, there was a statistically significant interaction effect between 
Transparency and own-population behaviour (all p< 0.001). For Diet, Smoking, Alcohol, and 
Finance, there was an increased discrepancy in effectiveness on own vs on population behaviour 
in opaque BI compared to the transparent one. However, for Exercise the difference was the other 
way around: participants rated the transparent BI as more likely to be effective on their own 
behaviour than on population behaviour and this discrepancy decreased in the opaque BI (see Table 
6). 
 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We found that transparent BIs were more acceptable than opaque BIs (Hypothesis 1) and this result 
held across all contexts taken individually except exercise. The type of argument given affected 
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the assessment of the BI, with BIs presented alongside positive arguments rated as more acceptable 
than those presented alongside negative or a mix of positive and negative arguments (Hypothesis 
3), but this was a small effect and the only two contexts that showed this effect individually were 
alcohol and finance. Nudges that are implemented by researchers were judged as being slightly 
more acceptable than BIs implemented by governments (Hypothesis 2), but this was such a small 
effect that it is not meaningful. There was no interaction effect between the designer of the BI and 
the type of argument given, contra Hypothesis 4. On average, all the BIs were considered 
acceptable for changing participants’ own behavior (with mean acceptability ratings above the 
mid-point of the scale), except for the opaque BI in the finance context; there was differential 
acceptability of BIs across contexts, with finance clearly least acceptable. 
 
As well as finding transparent BIs more acceptable than opaque ones, our participants regarded 
them as more likely to result in positive behavior change. Further, the effectiveness of the BIs was 
at least as influential a predictor of acceptability ratings as the ease of identification of the behavior 
change mechanism across the five contexts (and considerably more influential in some, especially 
finance and, interestingly, amongst smokers in the context of smoking cessation). There was a 
direct effect of ease of identification on acceptability—except, notably, for smokers when asked 
about BIs that discourage smoking—which we had expected given H1. This is consistent with 
arguments that people care about having a sense of agency over their actions (Osman, 2014) and 
past findings that people view opaque BIs as more autonomy-threatening than transparent ones 
(Jung & Mellors, 2016). However, the likelihood that the BI would result in positive behavior 
change had more predictive power in all contexts except exercise. Bang, Shu and Weber (2018) 
found mixed results on this point, with their Study 1, finding no relationship between effectiveness 
for self and acceptability but their Study 2 finding that the expected effectiveness of a change in 
choice architecture on one’s own behaviour predicted the acceptability of the change. Our results 
are consistent with those of Study 2. Our finding that people predict that the BI will be more likely 
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to be effective on the population as a whole than on their own behaviour is also consistent with the 
Bang, Shu and Weber (2018) finding that BIs will be more effective for others than for themselves. 
 
It is not surprising that people care about both transparency and effectiveness, that is an obvious 
prediction, which is also consistent with previous results (e.g., Arad & Rubinstein, 2018; Sunstein, 
2016). However, the relative importance of effectiveness is at odds with theoretical focus on the 
acceptability of transparency. For example, a parliamentary report in the UK identified the extent 
to which a BI is covert as one of two criteria that should bear on its acceptability (House of Lords, 
Science and Technology Select Committee, 2011). (The other being the extent to which the BI is 
popular with the public.) Our results are consistent with another survey study, whose authors also 
drew conclusions from average ratings: Petrescu et al. (2016) tested the hypothesis that stating that 
interventions work via non-conscious processes decreases their acceptability; they found no 
evidence to support the hypothesis but they did find that effectiveness of the BI was a predictor of 
acceptability (Petrescu et al., 2016). The authors of a qualitative study also reported that 
interviewees had very limited concerns with the manipulative aspects of BIs (Junghans, Cheung, 
& De Ridder, 2015). It is possible that transparency is a strong concern for a minority of people, 
for instance Arad and Rubinstein (2018) found that a minority of their subjects reported an 
opposition to BIs, and this was driven by concerns about manipulation and the fear of a “slippery 
slope” to non-consensual interventions. It is also possible that the use of survey methods decreases 
the impact of transparency and, if we had conducted a vignette study, then transparency would 
have been a more influential predictor of acceptability, since getting participants to imagine being 
in the situation would have simulated the feeling of being manipulated. 
 
Our finding that people rated transparent BIs as more effective than opaque is also surprising. In 
academic debates on the acceptability of BIs, it has been assumed that transparency and 
effectiveness pull in different directions (Bovens, 2009, House of Lords, Science and Technology 
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Select Committee, 2011). Bovens (2009, p.209 & p.217) says that these techniques “work best in 
the dark”. However, the participants in our sample did not seem to agree with that. (Ditto the 
participants of Jung and Mellers, 2016, who found that transparent, System-2 BIs were viewed as 
more effective for changing behavior). It could be that being able to identify a mechanism made it 
seem more likely to our participants that the BI will be effective, or there could be a halo effect 
where a more acceptable BI is generally judged to have more of other desirable properties as well. 
However, it seems that our participants’ folk psychology is right, since there are now several 
studies showing that disclosure does not affect effectiveness, most of which concern defaults 
(Bruns et al., 2018; Loewenstein et al., 2015; Steffel, Williams, & Pogacar, 2016) but one of which 
concerns the placement of food items in a snack shop (Kroese, Marchiori, & de Ridder, 2015). 
 
In our study, effectiveness was partially mediated by the desire to change behavior through the BI. 
In other words, when people believed that a BI would be effective then they wanted to use it to 
change their behavior. This supports the contention that people do want to achieve positive 
behavior change and they support BIs that will help them to do that; there is a sense in which 




We found a general lack of support for Hypotheses 2 - 4. There was only a very small effect of 
argument, a negligible effect of designer, and there was no evidence of the predicted interaction 
effect between argument and designer. The low impact of argument (and lack of interaction effect) 
is less surprising when we consider that the argument manipulation did not have much impact on 
effectiveness ratings. The lack of substantial impact of the designer of the BI is more surprising, 
given that scientists are more trusted than governments: an Ipsos Mori (2018) survey found that 
85% of British adults trust scientists to tell the truth, compared to 19% for politicians and 16% for 
advertising executives, and a previous study showed that people trust BIs that are developed and 
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proposed by scientists more than those that are developed and proposed by government (Osman et 
al., 2018). Osman et al. (2018) explained their result with reference to research on “source 
credibility” in the psychology of communication, which is the idea that people are more receptive 
when there is good fit between the area of expertise of the communicator (in this case the proposer 
of the BI) and the topic of communication (in this case the BI being proposed); for a review of the 
literature on source credibility, see Pornpitakpan (2004). It may be that our subjects did not see 
any differential in expertise, since we stressed that the advertisers and researchers were “Top” of 
their field and there were only negligible effects of the designer on ratings of whether the BI would 
positively change behavior. The idea that we would see an interaction effect between designer and 
argument was predicated on creating ambiguity, but as well as being unsuccessful at creating 
ambiguity about the likely effectiveness of the BI, we probably did not create ambiguity around 
the intention of the designer, since we had also stated that the aim of the BI was to promote positive 
behavior change. If participants thought that all three designers were equally effective and well-
intentioned, then there would be no reason for there to be an effect of designer on their judgments. 
 
We found that using BIs in finance was less acceptable than using BIs in other contexts. The mean 
acceptability of the health-related BIs ranged from 7.28 - 6.53 while the mean acceptability of 
finance-related BIs was only 4.72. Our results in the four health-related contexts are consistent 
with evidence that people approve of BIs for health behavior (Junghans, Cheung, & De Ridder, 
2015; Reisch, Sunstein, & Gwozdz, 2017).  We can only speculate about why our finance-related 
BIs were less acceptable, since we had only a single pair of transparent and opaque BIs in each 
context, and the BIs were not matched (matching was not possible given that we used BIs that had 
actually been implemented). The opaque finance-related BI was also the only BI that used a 
default. However, we do not think that it was the default alone that caused the low ratings, since 
there are field experiments whose results show that people approve of having their own behavior 
changed by BIs using defaults. For instance, after being exposed to a BI that presented the 
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vegetarian meal as a default when registering for a conference—increasing the number choosing 
the vegetarian meal from 13% to 89%—90% of those exposed said that they approved of changing 
the default (Hansen, Malthesen, & Schilling, 2019). Also, after an intervention that changed the 
default positions of sit-stand desks in a workplace to the standing position, increasing the rate of 
standing from 1.8% to 13.1%, 56.5% of employees said that it was acceptable to be unconsciously 
influenced in this way (Venema, Kroese, & De Ridder, 2018). 4   
 
In our multiple-choice follow-up question, we found that finance was a clear outlier, with the 
majority of participants saying that psychological methods should not be used in that context. We 
suspect that there are features that differentiate health from finance, which made the finance-
related BIs less acceptable. In health, everyone can agree that, for example, high sugar and high 
fat products are unhealthy. However, in finance, the best product for someone depends on their 
attitudes to risk. Even though a traffic-light rating marks the riskiest products as red, those may be 
the most appropriate products for some people; ditto a default product may not be the best choice 
for everyone.5 Therefore, people may be more skeptical that BIs in finance will actually promote 
 
4 In contrast, Felsen, Castelo and Reiner (2013) found a lack of approval for defaults in organ 
donation, but this does not affect the point that the acceptability of defaults is context-dependent 
and that in at least some contexts they are acceptable. 
5 Of course, a default in health may not be best for absolutely everyone at all times. For instance, a 
diabetic with hypoglycaemia does need high sugar food or an anorexic may need to eat more in 
general. However, it is no coincidence that these are both clinical conditions. The vast bulk of the 
population needs to eat well on balance, which can be done by following healthy eating guidelines. 
In contrast, in finance, all we can say is that the vast bulk of the population needs retirement 
products. But the best way of saving for retirement will show a lot of individual variation, due to 
differing risk preferences and other factors, such as longevity risk. 
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their wellbeing. In our study, people considered that BIs were least likely to have a positive effect 
in finance (in fact, with a mean of 3.84, the rating of BIs in finance was on the non-effective side 
of the scale), and the differential predictive power of effectiveness and ease of identification on 
acceptability ratings was particularly striking for finance. In the regression models, the coefficient 
on effectiveness was higher for finance than for any other context. So our participants had a high 
concern for effectiveness of the finance BI, but did not think that it would have those good effects.  
 
Another reason participants may have been dubious about the effectiveness of the finance BI is 
that they might be worried about whether the default will benefit them if it is influenced by 
industry, as the bank may wish to default them into an option that will be profitable for the bank. 
Since the financial crisis, attitudes to the financial services industry have become more negative 
(Bennett & Kottasz, 2012), and some authors have concluded that there is now a crisis of trust in 
that sector (Bachmann, Gillespie, & Kramer, 2011; Sapienza, & Zingales, 2012). This lack of trust 
may also help explain why people tend to think that finance-related BIs are less likely to lead to 
positive changes than health-related interventions and why they find finance-related BIs less 
acceptable. This is ironic because financial literacy around retirement saving and pension plans is 
low (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011a, 2001b), suggesting that there is scope for using BIs to improve 
outcomes in this area.  
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Table 1: Participant profile from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 combined 
Sample US UK 
Total 
participants 
N = 872 (all US residents, US 
nationals, first language English) 
N = 843 (all UK residents, UK 
nationals, first language English) 
Females 471 (54%) 413 (49%) 
Age Mean 35 (SD = 12.24) ranging from 
18-74 




Mixed, 56.7% qualified with a degree 
(at least a bachelor degree, maybe 
postgraduate qualification as well) 
Mixed, 57.1% qualified with a degree 
(at least a bachelor degree, maybe 
postgraduate qualification as well) 
Political 
affiliation 
51.6% identifying as left, 8.6% as 
centre, 16.7% as right, and 23.1% as 
other 
47% identifying as left, 16.1% as 
centre, 17% as right, and 19.9 % as 
other 
Religion 38.9% reported that they did not have 
one, 5.4% reported that they were not 
sure, 55.7% reported that they were 
religious 
37.2% reported that they did not have 
one, 9.5% reported that they were not 
sure, 53.3% reported that they were 
religious 
Smokers 135 (15.5%) smokers, 
10 (1.4%) prefer not to say 
112 (13.3%) smokers, 




Table 2. Recommended Psychological Method: Description of Transparent and Opaque BIs  
Context Transparent version Opaque version 
Exercise Design stairwells with ‘point-of-choice’ 
signage that displays messages about the 
health advantages of taking the stairs, such 
as ‘Stair climbing burns more calories per 
minute than tennis’, ‘7 minutes of stair 
climbing per day protects your heart’, etc.  
  
Design stairwells by hanging artworks. 
Pictures are changed periodically to keep 
stair users interested, to prolong 
effectiveness.   
  
Diet Design packaging on food so that the front 
label includes nutritional information, by 
using a simple traffic light system (red, 
amber, green) to indicate how much 
saturated fat, salt and sugar, and calories 
are in food products.   
Design the size of plates so that the 
quantity of food on them is adjusted. 
Large plates and bowls can make 
servings of food appear smaller, whereas 
smaller plates can lead people to 
misjudge that very same quantity of food 
as being significantly larger.   
Smoking Design cigarette packaging so that it 
incorporates graphic pictures of damaged 
lungs and warnings such as ‘Smoking 
seriously harms you and others around 
you”, “Smoking harms your unborn baby'.     
Increasing the length of the filter by 
10mm and at the same time reduce the 
length of the cigarette to 60mm.    
 
Alcohol Design signage in pubs and restaurants so 
that they include messages such as the 
following: “men and women are advised not 
to regularly drink more than 14 units a 
week” and “spread your drinking over three 
days or more if you drink as much as 14 
units a week”.     
Design the glassware used in pubs and 
restaurants in such a way so that straight 
glasses are used, because relative to 
curvy glasses, it is easier to judge and 
pace the amount of alcohol consumed.   
Finance Design investment schemes in such a way 
so that customers can evaluate the 
associated riskiness of each product based 
on a traffic light system; red indicates highly 
risky, green indicates low risk.   
Design investment schemes with an 
automatic enrolment system so 
Bank/Building Society will decide on an 
individual’s behalf exactly how the money 
will be allocated to investment schemes. 
Although if the individual didn’t want it, 
they could opt-out of the scheme, this 
would involve filling in relevant 





Table 3: Positive and negative arguments for each BI 
Context Argument for it to work Argument for it not to work 
Transparent version Opaque version Transparent version Opaque version 
Exercise By presenting 
messages at 
strategic positions, 
people will be 
encouraged to use 
stairs instead of lifts 
or 
escalators/elevators, 
and this in turn will 
encourage people to 
value being more 
active and in turn, 
exercise more in 
general. 
By presenting 
artworks along the 
stairwell this is more 
likely to encourage 
people to use stairs 
instead of lifts or 
escalators/elevators, 
and this in turn will 
encourage people to 
value being more 
active and in turn, 
exercise more in 




people will avoid the 
stairs and hence the 
messages for the 
reason that they 
don’t want to feel 
guilty about not 
exercising enough, 
meaning that this 
method will lead 
people to being less 
active. 
The artwork along 
the stairwell is not 
changed regularly 
enough, and people 
get bored looking at 
it, and so to avoid 
looking at it most 
people end up taking 
the lift to avoid it, 
and in turn overall 
get less exercise.   
Diet By making it easier 
for people to 
interpret the 
nutritional content of 
food items through a 
traffic-light labelling 
system, people will 
be more aware of 
which foods are 
healthier than 
others, and in turn 
adopt/maintain a 
healthier diet. 
By making the plates 
smaller, people 
would be better able 
to adjust the amount 
of food they put on 
their plate, and avoid 
overconsumption of 
food, and in turn 
adopt/maintain a 
healthier diet.   
By making it easier 
for people to 
interpret the 
nutritional content of 
food items, people 
change their eating 
habit and as a result 
consume more food 
to compensate for 
eating healthily, 
meaning that this 
method increases 
people’s overall daily 
calorie intake. 
By making the plates 
smaller, people 
change their eating 
pattern and as a 
result consume more 
food to compensate 
for the smaller plate, 
meaning that this 
method will lead to 
increases in peoples 
overall daily calorie 
intake. 
Smoking By highlighting the 
negative physical 






with smoking, and 
this will encourage 
smokers to reduce 
or even stop 
smoking. 
If a standard 
cigarette is 70mm 
then cutting back on 
the harmful 
chemicals and 
replacing it with 
more filter would 
seem as if the size of 
cigarette haven’t 
changed but the 
amount of harmful 
chemical is reduced. 
By reducing nicotine 
content adequately, 
this method helps 
smokers gradually 
adapt to lower 
nicotine levels, and 
this will encourage 
By highlighting the 
negative physical 
and moral issues 
concerning smoking, 
smokers will feel 
more defensive of 
their smoking habit, 
and as a result, 
smokers will end up 
smoking more, 
meaning that the 
method will lead to 
increases in 
smoking. 
By reducing the 
length of the 
cigarette and cutting 
back on nicotine 
content, people will 
change their 
smoking habit and 
as a result smoke 
more to compensate 
for the shorter 
cigarette, meaning 
that this method will 





smokers to reduce or 
even stop smoking. 
Alcohol By informing people 
about the actual 
appropriate amount 
of alcohol 
consumption that is 
reasonable to be 
consumed in a 
typical week, 
because people will 
be more aware of 
exceeding the limit 
and this should in 
turn reduce alcohol 
overconsumption. 
By changing the 
containers that are 
used to serve 
alcohol, this will in 
turn reduce the 
actual amount of 
alcohol consumed at 
any one sitting, and 
this should in turn 
reduce alcohol 
overconsumption.   
By informing people 
about the actual 
appropriate amount 
of alcohol 
consumption that is 
reasonable to be 
consumed in a 
typical week, those 
who drink lightly will 
consume more 
alcohol as they 
believe it is safe to 
drink 14 units a 
week, meaning that 





By changing the 
shape of the 
containers that are 
used to serve 
alcohol, people 
change their drinking 
habit and as a result 
consume more 
alcohol to 
compensate for the 
smaller container, 
meaning that this 




Finance By making it easier 
for people to 
interpret the 
riskiness of an 
investment scheme 
through a traffic-light 
labelling system, 
people will be more 
aware of which 
financial products 
are risker than 
others, and in turn 
help them make a 
better financial 
decision.    
Because people find 
it difficult to think 
about their future 
financial status, so 
making the 
investment schemes 
a default would 
encourage people to 
invest their savings, 
and in turn help them 
make a better 
financial decision.  
By making it easier 
for people to 
interpret the 




system, the method 
highlights the 
potential financial 
gains through risky 
choices, meaning 
that it will lead 
people to taking 
more gambles with 
their money and be 





doesn’t take into 
account the fact that 
people have different 
needs because their 
lifestyles are 
different, and as a 
result the scheme 
means that in the 
long run, overall 





Table 4: Regressions showing predictors of Acceptability ratings in each context 










Exercise     
Model 1E .325, p < 0.001   0.105 
Model 2E  .324, p < 0.001  0.105 
Model 3E   .372, p < 0.001 0.138 
Model 4E .230, p < 0.001 .228, p < 0.001  0.148 
Model 5E .203, p < 0.001 .037, p = 0.295 0.259, p < 0.001 0.173 
Diet     
Model 1D .280, p < 0.001   0.078 
Model 2D  .463, p < 0.001  0.213 
Model 3D   .473, p < 0.001 0.223 
Model 4D .161, p < 0.001 .414, p < 0.001  0.237 
Model 5D .141, p < 0.001 .218, p < 0.001 .259, p < 0.001 0.262 
Smoking     
Model 1S .154, p < 0.001   0.023 
Model 2S  .375, p < 0.001  0.140 
Model 3S   .281, p < 0.001 0.079 
Model 4S .112, p < 0.001 .362, p < 0.001  0.152 
Model 5S .111, p < 0.001 .375, p < 0.001 .076, p = 0.008 0.155 
Smoking—
smokers only     
Model 1SS .072, p = .261   0.001 
Model 2SS  .463, p < 0.001  0.212 
Model 3SS   .416, p < 0.001 0.170 
Model 4SS .003, p = 0.963 .463, p < 0.001  0.208 
Model 5SS .002, p = 0.978 .347, p < 0.001 .155, p = 0.071 0.216 
Alcohol     
Model 1A .270, p < 0.001   0.072 
Model 2A  .285, p < 0.001  0.081 
Model 3A   .282, p < 0.001 0.079 
Model 4A .208, p < 0.001 .229, p < 0.001  0.120 
Model 5A .198, p < 0.001 .138, p < 0.001 .125, p < 0.001 0.127 
Finance     
Model 1F .330, p < 0.001   0.108 
Model 2F  .642, p < 0.001  0.411 
Model 3F   .623, p < 0.001 0.388 
Model 4F .140, p < 0.001 .597, p < 0.001  0.429 




Table 5: Effectiveness as a predictor of Desire to change behavior  
 
Context ß (standardized) p Adj R2 
Exercise .781  < 0.001 .610 
Diet .787  < 0.001 .619 
Smoking .621 < 0.001 .385 
Alcohol .745 < 0.001 .555 





Table 6: Likelihood of Effectiveness of the BI on Own and Population Behaviour, and the 
discrepancy between them (Effectiveness on Own behaviour – Effectiveness on Population 


















- 0.07 0.254 




-0.41 < 0.001 




0.41 < 0.001 














-0.55 < 0.001 




-0.25 < 0.001 




-0.64 < 0.001 














Figure 1: Comparison of the Ease of identification ratings of Transparent and Opaque BIs in 

















































Figure 4. Comparison of the acceptability ratings depending on which Arguments were given 






Figure 5. Comparison of the acceptability ratings depending on the Designer of the BI in each 















Figure 6: Percentage who indicated that context(s) SHOULD NOT involve psychological 
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